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15 Sovereignty without sovereignty 
The Belgian solution 
Raf Geenens 
“Let us delete the word sovereignty from our vocabulary” 
Benjamin Constant (1830) 
At least since 1950, Belgian constitutional law is in the grip of a myth: the myth 
of national sovereignty.1 Framed as an originalist claim about the meaning of arti-
cle 25 at the time of its ratification, scholars and judges alike hold that sovereignty 
in the Belgian context means ‘national sovereignty’.2 National sovereignty is here 
understood as the opposite of popular sovereignty, in line with the conceptual 
dichotomy expounded by, among others, French legal theorist Raymond Carré 
de Malberg. In recent years, several authors have demonstrated that this inter-
pretation of the Constitution is highly anachronistic (De Smaele, 2000; Deseure, 
2016; Geenens and Sottiaux, 2015). The Belgian drafters, when working on the 
Constitution in 1830–1831, did not understand sovereignty in the terms that 
are now routinely ascribed to them. The national sovereignty myth, it seems, is a 
product of muddled thinking. In order to stave off the push for more – and more 
direct – democracy, subsequent generations of legal scholars applied ever thicker 
conceptual layers to the Constitution, up to the point where it has come to say 
nearly the opposite of what it said in 1831. 
Although the myth is increasingly criticised for its lack of historical accuracy, 
some scholars cling to it (e.g. Clement and Van de Putte, 2018; De Schepper, 
2018; Keunen and Bijnens, 2017). Others have abandoned the originalist claim 
and instead now suggest that the national sovereignty interpretation derives its 
authority from opinio juris: through a long line of precedents, the vague notion 
1 As author of this text, I am solely responsible for all potential errors. However, to the extent 
that it contains something valuable, this is certainly owing to the colleagues and PhD students 
with whom I have been collaborating on this topic in the past years. I want to thank them 
explicitly for this: Olga Bashkina, Brecht Deseure, Bas Leijssenaar, Christophe Maes, Stefan 
Sottiaux, Nora Timmermans, and Ronald Van Crombrugge. 
2 Article 25 is today article 33. When referring to articles of the Belgian Constitution, I will 
always use the numbering of 1831. The full text of the 1831 version of the Constitution can 
be consulted in Stevens et al. (2008, pp. 71–97). I will sometimes use ‘1831’ as shorthand for 
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of sovereignty in article 25 has “crystallized” into the doctrine of national sov-
ereignty, and this is enough to give the myth legal weight (Alen, 2015; Velaers, 
2019, p. 8). This willingness to maintain the concept of national sovereignty 
suggests that the wide gulf that separates it from the mental world of 1831 is still 
not fully appreciated. 
This, then, is the central aim of this chapter. I intend to present a coherent 
picture of what the authors of the Belgian Constitution thought about sover-
eignty so as to lay bare the multiple differences between the drafters’ ideas on 
sovereignty and the national sovereignty myth. These differences are important 
not only for historical reasons, but also for practical ones. If the conflict between 
the drafters’ understanding of sovereignty and the national sovereignty myth is 
as big as I claim it to be, resorting to opinio juris is a wrong-headed approach. It 
requires one either to discard the 1831 meaning of the text as irrelevant, or to 
accept as legally valid two incompatible interpretations of the Constitution. Both 
options are an affront to legal integrity. Understanding these differences also 
matters for philosophical reasons. The Belgian drafters’ thinking on sovereignty 
had a richness to it which the national sovereignty myth has completely obscured. 
Both 1831 and the myth can be understood as conceptual strategies to keep the 
full effects of popular sovereignty at bay, yet strategies that are far from identical. 
Of the two, 1831 is certainly the more elegant one. 
In the following sections, I begin by interpreting article 25 in light of the 
intellectual and political circumstances in which the drafters found themselves in 
1830–1831. I then seek support for this interpretation by looking at the debates 
in contemporary newspapers and by situating it in the drafters’ broader constitu-
tional vision. In the second half of this chapter, I discuss the national sovereignty 
myth. After briefly presenting its core tenets, I explain why it is untenable and 
why it remains, even with slight alterations, indefensible. By way of conclusion, 
I turn to the constitutionality of referendums, as this is the question that has 
become the litmus test for interpretations of article 25. 
Article 25 in 1830–1831 
From 1815 to 1830, lawyers, journalists, clerics, and other members of the edu-
cated classes in the southern part of the Netherlands went through a roller coaster 
of political experiences and new ideas. The Belgian Constitution is, before any-
thing else, a reflection of their collective trajectory. Two elements are particularly 
important in that trajectory. First, they were privileged witnesses to the decline 
of monarchical rule. As Markus Prutsch explains elsewhere in this book, consti-
tutional monarchism might have looked attractive in 1814, but was doomed to 
be a transitional phenomenon.3 With tradition no longer available as a source of 
legitimacy, and the public – helped by the press – constantly watching over politi-
cal decisions, kings lost their independence. Their legitimacy now depended on 





gaining the support of popular opinion and they were forced to find an entente 
with the press. William I, coming at the head of the newly united Netherlands 
in 1815, proved spectacularly inept at this, at least in the southern half of his 
realm. His attempts to concentrate all power in his own hands, his stubbornness 
in the debate on ministerial responsibility, and his heavy-handed tactics against 
the opposition press, taught his southern subjects that centralised power was 
to be distrusted, that parliamentarisation was the only way forward, and that a 
free press and public opinion were crucial guarantees for liberty. These 15 years 
were also formative for a second reason. In the course of the nineteenth century, 
citizens across Europe came to discover that constitutions are uniquely powerful 
tools: they can be used not only to justify political and legal institutions, but also 
to denounce incautious rulers (cf. Grotke and Prutsch, 2014). Southern activists 
learnt this lesson early. Their conflicts with King William I almost invariably con-
cerned constitutional values: no matter whether they clashed about ministerial 
responsibility, freedom of the press, or clerical appointments, the interpretation 
of the Constitution was always involved. Publicists disseminated these conflicts 
through the numerous newspapers, thereby creating, in what would soon become 
Belgium, a politically aware public and a strong constitutional culture.4 
If, shortly after the Belgian Revolution, the drafters managed to produce an 
exemplary and coherent constitution within a short span of time, it is because 
they had been writing and talking about constitutional matters for 15 years.5 The 
constitution that came out of this long gestation period expressed their central 
concerns: it was to guarantee liberty and stability by setting up counterbalancing 
institutions, by shuffling power away from the king, and by cementing the force 
of public opinion into the constitutional edifice. The keystone of this programme 
was article 25: “All powers emanate from the Nation. They are to be exercised as 
prescribed by the Constitution”. 
In order to get a clear view of what this article is aiming at, we should start by 
carefully looking at its formulation. The second half of the article is, of course, 
rather straightforward: it reflects the drafters’ awareness of the importance of 
constitutions in maintaining liberty. But the meaning of the first half is more 
disputable. This first sentence is usually presented as a statement about sover-
eignty, but most commentators have failed to notice the obvious, namely that 
the word sovereignty is absent. This absence is significant because many other 
constitutions of the era (see, most famously, the French Constitution of 1791) 
contain lengthy, explicit statements about sovereignty, for instance claiming 
4 The most striking illustration is the extensive courses in constitutional theory which Pierre-
François Van Meenen published in serialised form in L’Observateur belge from 1815 to 1820. 
5 The Belgian Constitution is often described as an “eclectic” or “mosaic” creation because 
fragments of the text can be traced to divergent sources (cf. Descamps-David, 1891; Gilis-
sen, 1968; De Smaele, 2005). Even Joseph Lebeau, one of its authors, already described it 
as “eclectic” in December 1830 (Huyttens, 1844a, p. 416, 13 December 1830). Retrospec-
tively, however, it is clear that the Constitution, at the level of content, is rather loyal to a 
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that it is indivisible or unalienable. Nothing similar can be found in the Belgian 
Constitution. Only the word “powers”, in the plural, is used. Equally remarkable 
is the choice of “emanate from” (in French: “émanent de”). Again, the com-
parison with other constitutions is instructive. The Revolutionary Constitution of 
1791 states that sovereignty “belongs to” (“appartient à”) the nation. The con-
stitutions of 1793 and 1795 use the even stronger formula “resides in” (“réside 
dans”).6 And then there is the choice of the term “nation” (“nation”) over alter-
natives such as “people” (“peuple”), which was used in 1793, or “the totality 
of citizens” (“l’universalité des citoyens”) as in 1795. The importance of this 
choice should not be overplayed. The members of the constituent assembly, as 
well as the contemporary newspapers, consistently used the terms ‘people’ and 
‘nation’ interchangeably. And in the Constitution’s Dutch translation, produced 
by the provisional government in 1831, article 25 contains the word “people” (in 
Dutch: “volk”) rather than nation.7 
What to make then of the entire statement? What does it say about sover-
eignty? My hypothesis is that this sentence is not about sovereignty strictly speak-
ing. It does not indicate who is holding the highest office or who is wielding 
supreme command, nor does it name the author of all legislation.8 It is rather 
a statement about the origin of all constituted powers, that is, it is a statement 
about what can more accurately be called original constituent power. This is 
not surprising. The congressmen clearly thought that it was important to be 
aware of the source of their power. Again and again, they describe the constituent 
assembly as “emerging from the people” or “originating […] from the nation”.9 
Moreover, they made key declarations – such as the two eternity decrees – “in 
the name of the Belgian people”. Their constant references to the people (or the 
nation), both in speech and in article 25, unambiguously recognise the people as 
the origin of all powers and thereby confirm the modern idea that there can be 
no other source of legitimacy. 
At the same time, the congressmen clearly believed that the people’s con-
stituent power had been transferred to the National Congress and would, 
once its work was done, be relegated “to a nearly inaccessible sphere”, as Jean-
Baptiste Nothomb, one of the leading drafters, put it (Huyttens, 1844a, p. 
424, 14 December 1830). In other words, the founders did not believe that 
6 Even though republican congressmen, like Pierre Seron, tried to claim that article 25 should 
be read to mean that sovereignty “resides in” the nation and that “sovereignty is inalienable” 
(Huyttens, 1844b, p. 15, 3 January 1831). 
7 It does not follow that the choice of the word ‘nation’ was arbitrary. In French, as in other 
European languages, the word ‘people’ can refer not only to the citizenry as a whole but also 
to the lower classes. ‘Nation’, in contrast, always had more dignified connotations. 
8 Of course, a lot depends on the definition of terms. According to Richard Tuck, sovereignty 
(in opposition to “government”) was the term that Hobbes and Rousseau used to indicate 
what is now usually called constituent power, i.e. the power to create or alter society’s basic 
laws and institutions (Tuck, 2016). 




the people’s constituent power would continue to play a substantial role. It 
had emerged out of the people into the constituent assembly and was meant to 
stream, beyond the assembly, into a constitutional system of powers. However, 
if the people’s constituent power has no real role in this system, it is not obvi-
ous why it has to be mentioned in the Constitution. After all, a constitution is 
supposed to become useful once the constituent work is done. It seems that the 
drafters wanted to constantly remind all power-holders of the ultimate source 
of their powers. This means that the role of the people, qua constituent power, 
becomes primarily a symbolic one. The people are the discursive anchoring point 
that permanently provides the constitutional project with its legitimacy. 
If article 25 is not truly a statement about sovereignty, how can we know what 
the drafters thought about sovereignty? First of all, we should give full weight to 
the observation that they chose not to say anything explicit about sovereignty in 
the Constitution. The fact that the Constitution’s vocabulary does not include 
the word sovereignty suggests that its authors disliked this word or, at the very 
least, that they did not find it helpful in expressing their constitutional vision. 
This already tells us something about their constitutional vision. Secondly, we can 
look at what they said about sovereignty in the constituent assembly. As Brecht 
Deseure (2016) has demonstrated, the debates in this assembly show that an 
overwhelming majority of members accepted popular sovereignty as an indisput-
able principle for which there is, in modern times, no alternative. They clearly 
believed that the political regime they were creating encompassed the principle 
of popular sovereignty and that its norms and rules and all elements of its func-
tioning would be compatible with this principle.10 With one lonely exception to 
confirm the rule, no member of the constituent assembly ever put into question 
the people’s sovereignty. 
This creates something of a riddle. If the drafters accepted the principle of 
popular sovereignty, why did they not explicitly include it in the constitutional 
text? What to make of this refusal to express the role of the people in terms of 
sovereignty? The context is crucial here. The Belgian constitutional project was 
driven by a double fear. On the one hand, the congressmen feared the concentra-
tion of excessive state power in the hands of a monarch, as they had so recently 
seen exemplified by the autocratic rule of William I. On the other hand, in line 
with post-revolutionary sentiment across Europe, they continued to be haunted 
by the Reign of Terror. The term ‘sovereignty’ was associated with both these 
dangers. Whether sovereignty belonged to a king or was exercised in the name of 
the people, either way it could collapse into despotism. Sovereignty, it seemed, 
was intrinsically connected with a monolithic ‘will’, with the concentration of all 
authority in one point, and with unlimited and arbitrary power. As the debates in 
10 Speakers in the National Congress stated, for instance, that a parliamentary monarchy is 
always based on the “sovereignty of the people”, or even that all modern societies are based 
on the “sovereignty of the people”, without meeting any resistance or correction (cf. Huyt-
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the National Congress demonstrate, the abhorrence for uncontrolled, centralised 
power was shared across the political spectrum, with the possible exception of the 
republican minority and some ardent monarchists. 
The dominant liberals and liberal-Catholics also had their own, additional rea-
sons for disliking sovereignty. Liberals were primarily concerned with individual 
liberty. And as they associated sovereignty with a strong state, they naturally 
viewed it as inimical to the liberty of individuals. Moreover, they feared the vola-
tility and capriciousness of a strong collective will. If liberals were in favour of 
monarchy, it is because they believed the stability provided by a neutral king 
would help to curb the unpredictable effects of popular sovereignty: “Heredity 
and inviolability are two political fictions, two public necessities […]. Opposite 
these fictions appears, ever menacing, the sovereignty of the people” (Huyttens, 
1844a, p. 193, 19 November 1830). This statement by Nothomb is exemplary 
of the views of the liberal congressmen, who were worried about the potential 
hazards that come with an unrestrained collective will. 
The Catholic position was less uniform, running from liberal-Catholics who 
supported modern political ideas to deeply anti-modern, ‘intransigent’ ultramon-
tanes. Almost all of them quickly perceived the practical benefits of a liberal con-
stitution: a weaker state would give them more leeway in, say, the running of 
schools or the appointment of priests. Liberal-Catholics also embraced individual 
liberty in a principled way, as a formal recognition of human dignity. But they 
also had principled reasons to rail against sovereignty. Leo de Foere, a leading 
Catholic, had argued in 1821 that popular sovereignty should not be under-
stood in too strong – i.e. too collectivist – a way, because social order necessarily 
originates from individual wills: “One would judge me wrong […] by attribut-
ing to me the doctrine of the exclusive and absolute sovereignty of the people. I 
believe sovereign power resides in the individual, or in individuals according to 
the modalities established by contracts” (De Foere quoted in Marteel, 2009, p. 
313). This dislike of popular sovereignty remained widespread among liberal-
Catholics. It seems that they associated sovereignty with the stifling, top-down 
imposition of homogeneity and uniformity. True vitality and unity, in contrast, 
“results from the autonomous life of every part of the social body”, as Lamennais 
put it in L’Avenir in December 1830, emphasizing the rich variety of “habits” 
and “moeurs” of different localities.11 Liberal-Catholics did not join ultramon-
tanes in fantasising about a corporatist, neo-medieval utopia,12 but they did hope 
for a decentralised society, based on “the ‘sovereign’ rights of organic social units 
like family, commune and province”, who should be allowed “to administer their 
11 Félicité de Lamennais quoted in Viaene (2001, p. 69). 
12 Among intransigent ultramontane Catholics, the rejection of sovereignty was even stronger. 
In De l’esprit de vie et de l’esprit de mort (1831), Henri de Merode and Ernest de Beauffort 
explicitly deplore the replacement of God’s sovereignty by popular sovereignty, which they 
call “the sovereignty of individual reason” and which they see as an expression of the “spirit 







own affairs as much as possible” (Viaene, 2001, p. 69). Thus, even if they mostly 
paid lip service to the principle of popular sovereignty, the idea of a unitary col-
lective will ran counter to their preferred vision of a liberated, “bottom-up” com-
munity of Christians (cf. Marteel, 2018, p. 237). 
Article 25 should be read as the joint outcome of these liberal and liberal-
Catholic attitudes towards sovereignty. By wording article 25 as they did, they 
could recognise the people’s power as the legitimate basis of government, and 
thereby nod to the principle of popular sovereignty (a principle which they took 
for granted), without having to rely on the notion of sovereignty. They had no 
problem accepting the citizens as the source of legitimacy, but they feared the 
idea of a monolithic, supra-individual collective agent. Given this negative atti-
tude towards sovereignty, it is not surprising that the Belgian Constitution is not 
about constructing a strong state that can channel the people’s united will, but 
rather about restraining sovereignty and cutting it up into a plurality of powers. 
The newspaper debate 
This picture is confirmed by the opinion pages of contemporary newspapers, 
where there was a vivid debate about sovereignty. Some newspapers assumed 
that the constitutional text simply enunciated the sovereignty of the people. 
But sharp-sighted observers noted that something more was going on.13 A 
good example is the exchange between the establishment newspaper Courrier 
des Pays-Bas (CDPB),14 with which many of the drafters were affiliated, and the 
conservative, ultramontane Courrier de la Meuse (CDM). This latter newspaper 
maintained that all power comes from God15 and argued that a regime of popular 
sovereignty would have disastrous consequences. In their editorials, journalists at 
Courrier de la Meuse repeatedly attacked what they perceived to be the majority 
position, namely the idea that the negative effects of popular sovereignty could 
be prevented by creating a system of opposing powers. According to them, this 
Montesquieu-inspired strategy was a mere illusion as sovereign power, in actual 
practice, is always located in one specific place: “Sovereignty is here, or it is there; 
but it is never in two places at the same time. It cannot be shared, it cannot 
be divided” (CDM, 9 December 1830, no. 296). Courrier de la Meuse insisted 
on the impossibility of dividing sovereignty from October 1830 all the way to 
March 1831, making this a leitmotiv of its opposition to the draft constitution. 
In an editorial at the beginning of March 1831, Le Courrier des Pays-Bas criti-
cised them head-on for this. Sovereignty might be unitary in its source, but its 
13 I owe the newspaper citations in this section to research by Christophe Maes (see Maes 
2020). 
14 Note that “des Pays-Bas” was dropped from its official name on 1 January 1831. I will refer 
to this newspaper by its original name. 
15 Within the constituent assembly, this position had no traction. It was voiced only once, by 
Pierre Vander Linden. Arguing against popular sovereignty, he solitarily claimed that all 












Sovereignty without sovereignty. The Belgian solution 277 
institutionalisation should be guided by the insight that power can only be lim-
ited by means of other powers. In absence of such a distribution of powers, we 
end up in despotism: 
In a system of dependent powers […] only the superior power is truly a 
power because only its will has to be executed: the inferiors can also will, but 
they can only will what the superior wills. This is exactly what we call unlim-
ited or absolute or despotic power. 
(CDPB, 5 March 1831, no. 64) 
Thus, a system of independent powers is needed, rather than a system in which 
all powers can be traced to one, central seat of sovereignty. In the same piece, 
Courrier des Pays-Bas noted that all powers were currently vested in the National 
Congress, which flew in the face of the principle of power distribution which this 
assembly was preaching. As was to be expected, the journalists at Courrier de la 
Meuse saw this as a good opportunity to mock their opponents. In the process, 
they gave the best possible summary of the majority position on sovereignty: 
The Courrier des Pays-Bas notices that our Congress possesses sovereignty 
(“est en possession de la souveraineté”) and is displeased by this. This is 
natural, for it wants sovereignty to be only in the nation, or rather, it wants 
sovereignty to be nowhere; because it actually wants there to be only powers 
that counterbalance each other, so as to assure order and liberty. 
(CDM, 10 March 1831, no. 59, italics modified) 
In the remainder of this opinion piece, they deride once again the idea of a divi-
sion of powers by emphasising, in a political-realist way, that final authority is 
always located somewhere. 
In contrast to this ultramontane view, republican newspapers insisted on the
unity of sovereignty out of principle. Although some republicans were heartened by
the fact that the Constitution sanctioned the principle of popular sovereignty, many
of them realised that things were not that simple. Already in mid-November 1830,
the republican journalists at L’Emancipation (EMP) warned their readers that they
should not be so naïve as to think that “All powers emanate from the nation”
means the same thing as “sovereignty resides in the nation”. The difference, they
write, is “enormous” (EMP, 15 November 1830, no. 26).16 For L’Emancipation, 
sovereignty equals legislative power equals the general will equals the nation: “(T) 
he sovereign has no other force than the legislative power, it is simply the general
will, and it is obvious that the general will or sovereignty can only exist in a general
form, that is, in the universality of the nation” (EMP, 15 November 1830, no. 26). 
16 This shows that even committed republicans did not think that the choice of the term 
‘nation’ was meaningful. Much more important for them was the omission of the term ‘sov-




Over time, republicans will increasingly oppose the constitutional project as 
it moves further away from this simple scheme in which sovereignty, a unitary 
legislative will, and the nation are identified with each other. In the run-up to the 
vote over bicameralism, a desperate L’Emancipation argues once again that the 
general will is necessarily “one” and “indivisible” (EMP, 10 December 1830, no. 
51). This plea is of no avail: the constituent assembly overwhelmingly votes in 
favour of creating a senate. 
Although I am only providing snippets here, I believe these newspaper 
exchanges do help us to pin down how well-informed observers perceived the 
Constitution at the time of its writing. In the next section, I want to demonstrate 
how the meaning of article 25, as construed above, fits into the broader web of 
constitutional ideas advocated by the dominant drafters. 
Public opinion and individual interests 
Throughout the months of the constituent assembly, the drafters’ core ideas 
always displayed the same duality: they recognised the citizens as the permanent 
anchoring point of legitimacy, but they refused to define the citizens’ role in a 
holistic manner. Their recognition of the citizens as the source and the ultimate 
touchstone for every exercise of power, is most visible in the importance they 
attached to public opinion. The new Constitution was to create a variety of chan-
nels through which public opinion would play a political role. For starters, the 
Constitution gives the press a maximum amount of freedom. This is because 
newspapers, pamphlets, and books serve both to build and to express public opin-
ion. Liberty, in the words of Catholic leader Etienne de Gerlache, would find a 
“guarantee in the omnipotence of public opinion through the press” (Huyttens, 
1844a, p. 471, 15 December 1830).17 The freedom of the press, in turn, would 
find a guarantee in the jury. Whereas William I had muffled journalists with the 
help of the courts, in Belgium they would be protected by the better judgment 
of their co-citizens. Jury trials, it was hoped, would become a reliable check on 
judicial and executive power (Delbecke, 2012). Public opinion would also have 
other conduits. Petitions, for instance, were seen by the founders as an important 
tool for correcting and steering public powers. And then there was, of course, the 
second chamber, often dubbed “the chamber of opinion”. Liberal heavyweight 
Charles de Brouckère, when describing its role in the constitutional edifice, writes 
that the second chamber will be “the expression of public opinion” because it 
“represents the nation from which all powers emanate” (Huyttens, 1844a, p. 
427, 14 December 1830). For good measure, he repeats: “public opinion, that is, 
17 The term ‘guarantee’ is very recurrent in the drafters’ speeches and betrays their common 
way of thinking: their global concern is to establish guarantees that would maintain liberty 
and stability. In Van Meenen’s lectures on constitutional theory (published in L’Observateur 
belge), the theme of ‘guarantees’ was already omnipresent. On the role of “garantisme” in 
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the nation” (ibid.). The second chamber was not just involved in lawmaking but 
also, importantly, in holding the government to account through the mechanism 
of ministerial responsibility. This latter mechanism was crucial, as it meant that 
all holders of executive power were, ultimately, accountable to the opinion of the 
electorate. 
The overall result, as Charles Blargnies put it in the constituent assembly, 
would be that “the law is the result of enlightened public opinion, as expressed 
by those who the people elect, by the press, and by petitions” (Huyttens, 1844a, 
p. 238, 22 November 1830). In the same speech, he described public opinion 
as the “true will of the people” (Huyttens, 1844a, p. 236, 22 November 1830). 
The theme of public opinion is also prominent in the publications of the key 
drafters. Charles-Hippolyte Vilain XIIII, in his Appel au Congrès published in the 
fall of 1830, writes that, through the jury and the press, “public opinion becomes 
the state’s greatest asset” (Vilain XIIII, 1830, p. 30). Joseph Lebeau, in his book 
on royal power, describes how, apart from counterbalancing powers, there is a 
further guarantee for liberty, namely “opinion”, which is connected to the press 
and works on parliament from the outside (Lebeau, 1830, p. 85). He even goes 
so far as to say that “representative government is the government of opinion” 
(Lebeau, 1830, p. 65). 
Lebeau’s formulations betray how close the drafters’ ideas on public opinion 
sit to those of Benjamin Constant, who is probably the main intellectual inspira-
tion for the Belgian Constitution.18 Although adopting Montesquieu’s division 
of powers, Constant discovered an additional, even more potent force that pro-
tects freedom, namely public opinion (Constant, 1815, p. 31).19 Arthur Ghins 
has recently brought to light just how important the notion of public opinion was 
for Constant. According to Ghins, public opinion came to function in Constant’s 
mind as an alternative to popular sovereignty (Ghins, 2021). Of course, Constant 
recognised the sovereignty of the people. His Principes de Politique starts, not 
incidentally, by explicitly stating that the principle of popular sovereignty cannot 
be contested (Constant, 1815, p. 13). But Constant was always worried about 
the voluntarist implications of sovereignty. In an article published in Le Temps
in 1830, shortly before his death, he even goes so far as to “deny” popular sov-
ereignty and he proposes to “delete the word sovereignty from our vocabulary” 
(Constant, 1989, pp. 176–177). 
Constant’s preferred conceptual substitute for popular sovereignty was public 
opinion, and it seems that the Belgian drafters followed him on this point. And 
just as was the case for Constant, their attachment to public opinion had every-
thing to do with their unwavering belief in the power of individual judgment. For 
18 It has already been demonstrated that the Belgians were heavily influenced by Constant 
when it came to ministerial responsibility (Van Velzen, 2005) and freedom of the press 
(Delbecke, 2012). 
19 On Constant and public opinion, see Fontana (1991, pp. 81–97), Fink (1998), Tenenbaum 




Constant, as for other members of the Coppet Group, freedom found its ultimate 
guarantee in the individual’s “right to judge and control laws and power” (Jaume, 
2012, p. 42). Indeed, this is what distinguishes Coppet-liberalism from other cur-
rents of French liberalism, in particular from the Doctrinaires, who favoured and 
trusted the state as the final underwriter of freedom (cf. Jaume, 1997; Garsten, 
2015). Similarly, in the debates in the National Congress, the idea of ‘judgment’ 
by the citizens is a recurrent trope. See, for instance, its appearance in Lebeau’s 
intervention on bicameralism. In this imposing speech, arguably one of the high 
notes of the entire constituent period, Lebeau claims that a bicameral system 
turns the nation into a judge, which is a decisive advantage over a unicameral 
system. When the chambers disagree, each chamber will defend its opinion with 
reasons, majority against majority, giving the court of public opinion the oppor-
tunity to judge the strength of these opposing reasons (Huyttens, 1884a, pp. 
413–414, 13 December 1830). 
While the drafters emphatically wanted to empower the judgment of indi-
vidual citizens, they never characterised the working of these judgments in a 
collectivist manner. In line with this, they always avoided talking in terms of 
a ‘general interest’ which the nation could come to recognise.20 Instead, they 
repeatedly stated that the plurality of societal interests cannot be superseded. 
This theme was already prepared by Pierre-François Van Meenen’s constitutional 
lectures, published in L’Observateur belge from 1815 to 1820. According to Van 
Meenen, terms such as “the state”, “raison d’état”, “general will”, and “the com-
mon good” (and even “liberty” and “independence”) can become dangerous 
abstractions, in the name of which too much blood has already been shed. The 
only entities that really exist, he emphasises, are individuals, as well as individual 
rights, individual interests, and individual happiness (Van Meenen, 1815, pp. 
29–30). Some Catholics might have found this all a bit too individualistic, but 
this metaphysics clearly underpinned the dominant liberal view in Congress. 
This is, for instance, the basis of Nothomb’s case for bicameralism and, more 
generally, of his preference for “mixed government” (Huyttens, 1844a, p. 192, 
19 November 1830). According to Nothomb, “there is in society a plurality of 
interests” (Huyttens, 1844a, p. 425, 14 December 1830). Multiplying the sites 
of representation is therefore highly desirable. Rather than believing that any 
one representative institution can overcome this plurality, the different societal 
20 And when they do use a term such as “general interest”, they avoid using it in the singular. 
De Gerlache, for instance, talks of “the general interests of the nation” (Huyttens, 1844a, 
p. 472, 15 December 1830). Similarly, Van Meenen says “public interests” rather than “the 
public interest” (Huyttens, 1844a, p. 429, 14 December 1830). But not all speakers are 
so careful. Occasionally, one does find ‘monolithic’ expressions. Charles Destouvelles, for 
instance, describes the law as the outcome of “the general will” (Huyttens, 1844b, p. 253, 
24 January 1831). Compare this with the more scrupulous formulation of De Brouckère, 
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interests should find separate institutional expression. As Nothomb puts it: “I 
give to each the right of being represented” (ibid.).21 
Again, this brings the drafters close to Constant. As Lucien Jaume has abun-
dantly demonstrated, Constant’s individualism was directed against the French 
Revolutionary conception of representation as embodied in the Constitution of 
1791. In the 1791 conception, there is an obsession with unity, “a Unity that 
can be read from the representative operation”. It is the state, and only the state, 
that “can define the general interest”. Thus, “representation can never be the 
expression of separate interests” (Jaume, 1998, pp. 159–160). Constant’s crucial 
move was claiming that particular interests do have a right of expression. Rather 
than organising politics in such a way that the true or correct interpretation of the 
general interest can be found and imposed in a uniform manner, priority should 
be given to individuals with their own local interests and ideas (cf. Garsten, 2016, 
p. 254 f.; Ghins, 2018).22 In line with Constant, the Belgian drafters were con-
vinced that no unity or generality exists detached from the individuals involved 
(cf. Van Meenen, 1815, p. 30). When looking inside the black box of the so-
called ‘general interest’, one finds nothing but a plurality of particular interests. 
Hence, unity can only be the result of a constant dialogue between different and 
opposing forces. 
The republican minority clearly felt that this was the dominant mood in the 
constituent assembly and occasionally tried to push back. Eugène Defacqz, for 
instance, dedicated an entire speech to the theme of unity. He was careful enough 
to show his agreement on other key themes, explaining how the Constitution, 
the press, and public opinion would function as interlocking guarantees for free-
dom. But he was tired of the constant emphasis on plurality, on divisions, and 
on counterbalancing powers. Instead, he claimed that “unity” was “natural”, 
that the “truth” was “one”, and that “discord has to be weeded out” from all 
institutions if the citizens wanted to act in “unison” (Huyttens 1844a, pp. 421– 
424, 14 December 1830). Obviously, this solitary republican cry from the heart 
achieved nothing. It only emphasized how far all other drafters had moved away 
from the ‘unitarian’ spirit of the French Revolution. 
In summary, the intent behind the whole constitutional framework was to 
activate individual judgments and give them political weight, without succumb-
ing to any form of holistic thinking. Rather than excluding citizens from the 
legislative process and leaving it for representatives to proclaim the ‘general will’, 
the ‘public interest’, or other such dangerous abstractions, the aim was to mobi-
lise public opinion as a permanent and reliable force in the political game. Article 
25 naturally fits into this constitutional programme. It recognises the citizens 
21 Compare this with the formulation of Sieyès in Qu’est-ce que le tiers-état: “citizens only have 
the right to being represented in virtue of the qualities they have in common, not in virtue 
of the qualities that distinguish them” (Sieyès, 1988, p. 173). 





as the ultimate anchoring point of public powers, while avoiding the collectivist 
metaphysics of the sovereignty formulations from the French Revolution. 
The national sovereignty myth 
Surprisingly, most Belgian public law textbooks present an interpretation of arti-
cle 25 that claims loyalty to the founders’ intentions while clearly going against 
the grain of this constitutional programme. This ‘mythical’ interpretation grad-
ually emerged in the nineteenth century and gained near-universal acceptance 
after the referendum on the royal question in 1950. From then on, virtually all 
textbooks – as well as the courts – have come to read article 25 in light of the 
doctrine of national sovereignty. The key tenets of this doctrine are as follows. 
The Belgian drafters consciously adopted the view on sovereignty embedded in 
France’s 1791 Constitution (see e.g. Wigny, 1952, p. 223). In this view, purport-
edly developed by Sieyès (see e.g. Alen, 1995, p. 20), sovereignty is “unitary, 
indivisible, and unalienable” (Mast, 1966, p. 25) and belongs to “the nation” 
(see e.g. Van Goethem, 2002, p. 236; Velaers, 2006, p. 190), understood as an 
“indivisible collectivity comprising the citizens of the past, the present and the 
future” (Tilleman and Alen, 1992, p. 11). Because the nation, defined in this 
way, is an “abstract entity” – or even simply a “fiction” – that is “distinct from the 
individuals that compose it”, it can only express itself through representative insti-
tutions (Uyttendaele, 2005, pp. 34–35). This latter point is what distinguishes, in 
practice, national sovereignty from popular sovereignty, which supposedly entails 
direct democracy (see e.g. Vande Lanotte et al., 2015, pp. 208–209). 
The textbooks regularly quote Carré de Malberg to give more substance to 
this doctrine.23 In its full Malbergian version, the doctrine of national sovereignty 
is bound up with a positivist legal philosophy that sees the state as the supreme 
source of law. This state finds its legitimacy in the fact that it embodies the nation, 
a nation that is, however, nothing more than an intra-legal effect. It is postulated 
by law and expresses itself through legally constituted representatives or rather, in 
Carré de Malberg’s preferred terminology, organs. It is only through its organs, 
such as parliament, that the nation comes to have a will. This will, Carré de 
Malberg stresses, is “general”: it “cannot be understood as the sum of particular 
wills”, but “is itself part of the unity and indivisibility of the nation” (Carré de 
Malberg, 1922, p. 255). Thus, elected politicians do not represent “the totality 
of citizens individually considered, but their indivisible and extra-individual col-
lectivity as a whole” (Carré de Malberg, 1922, p. 223).24 And it is in this whole, 
“in this total and indivisible body, that exclusively resides sovereignty” (Carré de 
Malberg, 1922, p. 255). Note that this positivist logic deliberately presents law 
23 It is generally assumed that Carré de Malberg has provided the authoritative formulation of 
the national sovereignty doctrine, but the doctrine is of course not exclusively his (see the 
work of Adhémar Esmein, Julien Lafferière, Paul Bastid, and others). 
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as a closed system without an outside. Although the will of the nation should be 
considered the joint will of all its members, Carré de Malberg’s theory cannot 
provide resources to connect the content of the law to any reference point that 
exists outside or before it (cf. Mineur, 2012). The will of the representatives can 
be attributed to the nation only on the basis of constitutional rules, “not in virtue 
of the conformity which that particular will may have with the actual will of the 
people who elected the representatives” (Brunet, 2016, p. 434). 
In a bold anachronistic move, Carré de Malberg traces this positivist the-
ory of the state to 1791 and to Sieyès. In passing, he also names Belgium’s 
1831 Constitution as an example of his doctrine (Carré de Malberg, 1922, p. 
169). Jurists in post-war Belgium got Carré de Malberg’s hint and gratefully 
pushed the doctrine to its full practical conclusions. For instance, the Council 
of State would come to claim that the Belgian drafters consciously bestowed 
“sovereignty” on “the nation”, a nation that “encompasses past and future gen-
erations of citizens”.25 And it used this as an argument against the introduction 
of referendums, stating that it is “impossible to give a certain number of today’s 
citizens the power to replace the national representation, which is constitution-
ally established to express the will of that abstract being which our foundational 
act calls ‘the nation’”.26 Similarly, André Alen, the former president of Belgium’s 
Constitutional Court, writes that from “a constitutional perspective, there is an 
irrefutable presumption that the will of the representatives is the will of the peo-
ple” (Alen, 1995, p. 21). In this way, the national sovereignty doctrine became 
an important brick in the constitutional line of defence against demands for direct 
participation in Belgium. 
It is not a coincidence that many of the textbook authors quoted above held 
influential positions in Belgium’s legal and political institutions. In the decades 
after the Second World War, in an increasingly divided Belgium, elite compro-
mise-formation was seen as a crucial mechanism to pacify social relations and to 
maintain stability, a stability that was never more threatened than by the 1950 
‘royal’ referendum. For those wishing to operate in the name of raison d’état, 
shielded from democratic pressure, Carré de Malberg’s state-centric doctrine 
provided a convenient theoretical framework.27 Thus, the misreading of article 
25 in the national sovereignty myth was, just like the original formulation, moti-
25 Opinion of 15 May 1985, Part. Doc. Chamber 1983-84, no. 783/2, 8. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Note that, in post-war Italy and France, the anti-democratic implications of Carré de Mal-
berg’s conception of national sovereignty were clearly perceived and actively challenged by, 
among others, Costantino Mortati and Georges Vedel (see Rubinelli, 2020, pp. 147–150). 
Nothing similar has happened in Belgium. Note also that, later in life, Carré de Malberg 
became a critic of his own doctrine. Frustrated with its anti-democratic effects and with 
the increased power of parties in France, he started to advocate the introduction of popular 
referendums (Carré de Malberg, 1931). As Olga Bashkina explains in Chapter 10, Carré 
de Malberg came to the conclusion that one either had to provide a stronger connection 
between the parliament and the actual citizens, or else stop pretending that the parliament 






vated by a desire to keep the potentially threatening effects of popular sovereignty 
at bay. Having said that, the national sovereignty interpretation differs too greatly 
from the drafters’ views on sovereignty to be tenable. But before going into these 
differences, let me point out some of the minor problems that beset the national 
sovereignty interpretation. 
For starters, there is no textual or circumstantial evidence to support it, other 
than the choice of the word “nation” in the Constitution. However, no one in 
1830–1831, not even staunch republicans, seemed to find this choice particularly 
significant. It is also difficult to claim, on the basis of the text, a direct connection 
between the Belgian understanding of sovereignty and the French Revolutionary 
Constitution of 1791. In fact, the Belgian Constitution differs from this latter 
Constitution in at least three important respects. (i) In the 1791 Constitution, 
article 1 of the third section extensively defines sovereignty (as, inter alia, “indi-
visible” and “unalienable”). The Belgian Constitution contains no trace of this 
article. If the Belgian drafters took their conception of sovereignty from the 
1791 Constitution, it is at least remarkable that they did not copy any material 
from its article on sovereignty. (ii) Likewise, the Belgian drafters failed to copy 
any of the formulas that emphasise the representative nature of the regime. The 
Constitution of 1791 explicitly states that all powers can only be exercised “by 
means of delegation” and that the “French Constitution is representative”. This 
is the core message of article 2 of the third section. Nothing similar can be found 
in the Belgian Constitution.28 (iii) In order to defend the proximity of 1831 to 
1791, scholars also point to article 32 of the Belgian Constitution. This article 
states that “(t)he members of the two Chambers represent the Nation, and not 
only the province or the subdivision of the province that has appointed them”.29 
The corresponding article in the 1791 Constitution reads as follows: “The rep-
resentatives […] are not the representatives of a particular department, but of 
the entire Nation”. What I find most striking is not the similarity but rather the 
difference between the two articles. In France, representatives are supposed to 
represent only the nation, whereas the Belgian Constitution declares that they 
simultaneously represent a specific locality. In other words, Belgian representa-
tives are not supposed to purify themselves of partial interests. This should not 
surprise us. Many Belgian founding fathers believed that local powers (provinces 
28 There is, of course, a textual semblance between the Belgian formulation “All powers ema-
nate from the Nation” and the French sentence “The nation, from which all powers ema-
nate, can only exercise them by means of delegation”. The 1791 formulation might be the 
inspiration for the Belgian formulation, but the emphasis is certainly different. The French 
sentence is formulated to stress the element of representation, whereas the Belgian drafters 
left out the part about representation. Gilissen (1968, pp. 126–127) lists various potential 
sources of inspiration for the Belgian formulation and concludes that it is impossible to know 
which example the Belgian drafters followed. 
29 This is the original formulation of article 32. The current formulation (of what is now article 
42) reads as follows: “The members of the two chambers represent the Nation, and not only 




Sovereignty without sovereignty. The Belgian solution 285 
and communes) were a useful counterweight against centralising tendencies. In 
this regard as well, the Belgians were in tune with Benjamin Constant.30 
The national sovereignty doctrine also has an important conceptual weakness. 
Its advocates assume that popular sovereignty is necessarily associated with direct 
democracy, while national sovereignty would have a necessary connection with 
representative procedures. But this assumption is unwarranted: citizens express-
ing themselves in a referendum could just as well be construed as an organ of 
the nation.31 A further problem for the national sovereignty doctrine is posed by 
Carré de Malberg’s various historical inaccuracies. As is now generally acknowl-
edged, he misread the views of the French revolutionary constituent assembly 
(which were more democratic and more influenced by natural law than he could 
allow for) and he distorted Sieyès’ views (who cannot be presented as an advocate 
of the national sovereignty doctrine) (cf. Bastid, 1939; Bacot, 1985; Maulin, 
2003; Rubinelli, 2020). 
The major problem with the national sovereignty interpretation, however, is 
its utter incompatibility with the ideas of the Belgian founding fathers. The doc-
trine of national sovereignty, as worded by Carré de Malberg, involves a com-
mitment to the logical priority of the state and a specific, positivist view on legal 
validity: the law derives its legitimacy from a fictive subject that only appears once 
its organs have been created and authorised by the law to speak on its behalf. 
Such views are alien to the Belgian drafters, who were decidedly not legal positiv-
ists. Their ideas had the shape of a political theory: individual liberty has to be 
safeguarded through interlocking institutional guarantees and through modern 
forms of democratic participation. Moreover, the ultimate basis of legitimacy was 
not an intra-legal construction (a postulated nation), but was to be found in 
pre-legal, empirical reality: the opinions of actual citizens. The dominant groups 
in Congress, including liberal-Catholics, clearly operated on a liberal scheme: 
everything that is relevant – individuals, individual interests, associations between 
individuals – already exists outside and before its appearance in the political or 
legal sphere. Moreover, they assumed that the most basic norms (in particular: 
the fundamental rights of individuals and the sovereignty of the people) do not 
derive their legitimacy from positive law, but are valid independently of it. 
Even when cutting away Carré de Malberg’s legal-positivist conceptualisation, 
the doctrine of national sovereignty continues to clash with the drafters’ deep-
rooted convictions. What the three references traditionally used to explain the 
Belgian conception of sovereignty – the Constitution of 1791, Sieyès’s theory of 
the nation, and Carré de Malberg’s model of representation – ultimately have in 
30 On an anecdotal note it can be mentioned that Charles Rogier, an important liberal con-
gressman, begins his 1826 dissertation in law with a long quote by Benjamin Constant. In 
this passage, Constant claims that politicians need to have very strong local attachments 
(Discailles, 1893, p. 112, n. I; cf. Garsten, 2016, pp. 255 f.). I owe this reference to Chris-
tophe Maes. 
31 Inversely, it is perfectly conceivable for Carré de Malberg that the people are sovereign but 




common, is a typically French belief in the unity of the will: a will that is indivis-
ible and that transcends, in some way or other, the wills and interests of individual 
citizens (cf. Mineur, 2010, pp. 89–144). In 1791, this unitary tradition expressed 
itself by writing a monolithic conception of sovereignty into the Constitution. In 
the case of Sieyès, this belief in unity can be perceived throughout his early writ-
ings and speeches. In a crucial passage in Qu’est-ce que le tiers-état, he writes that 
we need “one nation, one representation, and one common will” (Sieyès, 1988, 
p. 157). In a 1791 speech defending unicameralism, he stresses that “the general 
will has to be one”; bicameralism inevitably leads to “counteractions” and there-
fore threatens the necessary unity of the law (Sieyès quoted in Rubinelli, 2020, 
pp. 63–65).32 In the work of Carré de Malberg, this unitarianism shows itself in 
the need for an indivisible, supra-individual subject as the holder of sovereignty. 
It also reveals itself in his emphasis on the unity of the general will, a point on 
which he openly agrees with Rousseau (cf. Carré de Malberg, 1922, p. 255). 
Belgium’s drafters, with their post-revolutionary sensibilities, wrote a consti-
tution that is the exact antithesis of this French unitarianism. In doing so, they 
were inspired by Montesquieu and his disciples in the Coppet Group, who are 
the only ones to have systematically challenged this deep unitarian instinct in 
France. The Belgian Constitution can without exaggeration be described as a 
living monument to the Montesquieu-Coppet philosophy. In light of this, it is 
truly astonishing that so many textbooks use a combination of terms such as 
‘sovereignty’, ‘unitary’, ‘will’, and ‘indivisible’ to explain the views of the Belgian 
founders. Paradoxically, such an explanation sits in many respects closer to the 
minoritarian republican position of 1830-1831 than to the majoritarian liberal 
and liberal-Catholic position. 
In defence of the myth 
The national sovereignty myth is premised on an originalist approach to the 
Belgian Constitution. When interpreting article 25 in light of the national sov-
ereignty doctrine, authors and judges claim to explain the meaning of the text 
in the way its original authors, and well-informed readers at the time of writ-
ing, understood it. It is clear by now that this originalist strategy is untenable. 
The national sovereignty doctrine is simply too different from how the drafters 
thought about sovereignty. Does it follow that the national sovereignty inter-
pretation cannot be defended at all? Actually, I believe there are three minimally 
plausible strategies one could follow if one really wished to hold on to it. 
32 But note that Sieyès was also concerned with limiting the excesses of sovereign power (inter 
alia by means of the division between constituted and constituent power) and did come to 
see that the “very idea of general will was inherently wrong” (Rubinelli, 2020, p. 70). As 
such, he became an important source of inspiration for Constant and other Coppet-thinkers, 
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1. A first possibility would be to tone down the national sovereignty doctrine to a 
mere belief in representation.33 The claim would then be as follows: ‘The Belgian 
drafters did not find direct decision-making by the citizens desirable. Instead, they 
believed that formal political power should be exercised by elected representa-
tives’. This claim is probably correct, but it is also very trivial. Virtually all nine-
teenth-century constitutions would then be examples of ‘national sovereignty’, 
so why use this particular term, with all its intellectual baggage? Moreover, by 
stating the claim in this way, detached from a more comprehensive view on sov-
ereignty and political participation, it becomes difficult to assess how important 
representation was for the drafters in comparison with some of their other views. 
2. Another slightly plausible strategy would consist in pointing out that ele-
ments of the national sovereignty doctrine were already available in 1830–1831. 
Even before the French Revolution, Jacques Necker toyed with the idea of the 
“wish” (“vœu”) of the nation, which he opposed to the short-term interests of 
the currently living citizens (Grange, 1974, pp. 269–270). Sieyès’s claim that 
indivisible representation is a precondition for national unity, which he formu-
lated during the French Revolution, inspired the later doctrine of national sover-
eignty and could also have inspired the Belgian drafters. Moreover, in the French 
Revolutionary assembly there was a heated debate between supporters and crit-
ics of the imperative mandate,34 a debate that contains in nuce the opposition 
between popular and national sovereignty.35 Maybe the drafters never explicitly 
endorsed these ideas, but they might have silently absorbed them. 
One could also mention the French Doctrinaire liberals, whose work gained 
steam and prominence during the 15 years leading up to the Belgian Revolution. 
According to the Doctrinaires, democracy and popular sovereignty contained 
“the seeds of tyranny” and might lead to the destruction of “the balance of 
opinions, interests, and classes” (Craiutu, 2004, p. 105). As an alternative, they 
proposed the sovereignty of reason and justice: rationality should become the 
norm for lawmaking and political power should be reserved, in perpetuity, for the 
33 This seems to be the core of the strategy pursued by Clement and Van de Putte (2018) 
who, in a recent article, defend the national sovereignty doctrine against various criticisms. 
They emphasise the fact that the Belgian founders were deeply elitist. This is, of course, true. 
Despite accepting the principle of popular sovereignty, the founders defined the suffrage 
in a very narrow way. But it is not obvious that their elitism was a matter of constitutional 
principle. Many of them were convinced that, over time, further enlightenment would allow 
for a broad extension of the vote. 
34 Note that, as opposed to what is often assumed, Sieyès did not fully side with the group 
that opposed the imperative mandate. Instead – because of his dislike for sovereignty – he 
sidestepped the debate by focusing on the distinction between constituent and constituted 
power (Rubinelli, 2020). 
35 It appears that the first recognisable formulations of this opposition are to be found in an 
1836 book by Simonde de Sismondi (cf. Paulet-Grandguillot, 2010, pp. 142 f.) and in an 






rational few.36 These ideas, which would later be assimilated into the theory of 
national sovereignty, might have sounded tempting to Belgium’s drafters. Thus, 
it is factually possible that they developed a view on sovereignty that was at least 
isomorphic to what would eventually become the national sovereignty doctrine. 
However, one would have to show that some or all of these elements were 
indeed picked up by the Belgian drafters. This remains a tall order. The closest 
one probably gets is by explaining that the drafters rejected the imperative man-
date and entrusted representation to assemblies whose members were elected by 
limited suffrage. These members were representatives, not just because they had 
been elected, but also because they carefully deliberated about the interests of 
the population. These points do betray the influence of the French Revolution 
and its intellectual aftermath. Proving more, however, seems difficult, as there is a 
wide gulf separating the Belgian drafters from the French cult of ‘unity’, ‘nation’, 
‘indivisibility’, and ‘sovereignty’ that would eventually culminate in the national 
sovereignty doctrine. There is also a fundamental dissensus between the authori-
tarian Doctrinaires and the mood of 1830–1831: the newly minted Belgians dis-
trusted the state, believed that the judgment of actively involved citizens is the 
ultimate and irreplaceable touchstone for political decisions, and would never 
sacrifice individual interests and opinions to an official policy of truth, reason, or 
justice.37 
3. A third strategy would be to abandon all originalist ambitions and instead 
claim that the national sovereignty interpretation receives its legal weight only 
from the accumulated opinions of later interpreters. This seems to be the option 
picked by André Alen (2015) and Jan Velaers (2019). Of the three strategies, this 
is certainly the most feasible one. After 1831, certain Belgian liberals (including 
some of the founding fathers themselves) tilted towards a raison d’état perspec-
tive and became concerned that article 25 would be interpreted in an overly 
populist way, which led to the emergence of a Doctrinaire interpretation of the 
Constitution.38 This Doctrinaire view gained influence in the second half of 
the nineteenth century and, together with other elitist and socially conservative 
tendencies, contributed to the adoption of the national sovereignty doctrine as 
the main conceptual scheme for understanding article 25. Thus, the national 
36 A good introduction to the notion of “sovereignty of reason” is provided by Aurelian Crai-
utu (2004, pp. 123–153), although he might be overstating the proximity to Constant (cf. 
Jaume, 2012; Ghins, 2018). 
37 Surprisingly, Els Witte claims that the Doctrinaire liberals were the dominant group among 
Belgian liberals during the run-up to the Belgian Revolution, that article 25 expresses the 
“sovereignty of reason”, and that liberals in the National Congress championed the idea of 
“sovereign reason” (Witte, 2018, pp. 94, 105–106, 108). Unfortunately, she does not pro-
vide any evidence for these claims. Patricia Popelier also tends to read 1831 in Doctrinaire 
terms (Popelier, 2007). 
38 The Doctrinaire reading seems to have emerged after the 1848 Revolution. The leading 
Catholic De Gerlache also moved away from the principle of popular sovereignty around 
1850. 
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sovereignty account can indeed be presented as the product of a long, collective 
process of reinterpretation. 
Despite its plausibility, this strategy has serious downsides. If one admits that 
the meaning of the constitutional text can be altered in unrecognisable ways 
through later interpretations, then one also has to accept that the national sover-
eignty view might wither away in light of changing needs and circumstances. One 
could even argue that the constitutional changes allowing non-binding referen-
dums at the local level (article 41, since 1999) and at the regional level (article 
39bis, since 2013) already signal the demise of the national sovereignty doctrine. 
My main objection to this strategy, however, is that it obscures the specificity and 
the ingenuity of the drafters’ take on sovereignty in 1831. This is especially unfor-
tunate because the ideas of 1831 might well be more appropriate and inspiring 
for today’s needs than the stale doctrine of national sovereignty. Of course, two 
conflicting interpretations can flourish side by side, but only one can be granted 
legal validity. 
Conclusion 
Bruce Ackerman has famously stated that the American founding fathers “failed” 
in one important respect (Ackerman, 2007; 2010). Convinced that Congress 
would be “the most dangerous branch”, they went to great constitutional lengths 
to contain its power. Yet the presidency has become much more dangerous as the 
rise of the party system turned it into a quasi-plebiscitary office. The founding 
fathers could not foresee this because “they were legislating for a world without 
national political parties” (Ackerman, 2007, p. 30). 
Their distant Belgian heirs, it seems, made a similar error. They believed that 
setting up counterbalancing institutions would contain the threat of power con-
centrations, but they failed to foresee that well-organised parties could thwart 
their design. With their members sitting in all political bodies, the power of par-
ties cuts across traditional divisions of power. In Belgium, this has created a situ-
ation where party leaders, who lack electoral accountability towards citizens and 
whose office is not described in the Constitution, have amassed astonishingly 
large amounts of power. Even the power-dividing mechanisms added after 1831, 
such as the Constitutional Court or federalism, have largely fallen victim to these 
same dynamics, leading some to claim that parliamentary democracy in Belgium 
is now a mere facade (Dewachter, 2001; 2014). 
I believe these unforeseen circumstances should play a role in the interpre-
tation of the Constitution, especially when it comes to the constitutionality of 
referendums – a question that is inextricably linked with article 25. Since 1950, 
all discussions about referendums have been conducted in light of the national 
sovereignty doctrine, which supposedly excluded referendums. But with the doc-




principles of the Belgian Constitution.39 Referendums are not mentioned in the 
text of the Constitution, but neither is the role of political parties. And the dis-
cussion was never merely about the letter of the text: referendums were deemed 
irreconcilable with the general conception of participation and representation 
expressed in the national sovereignty doctrine. 
Ultimately, when deciding upon the constitutionality of referendums, one 
has to weigh several elements against each other. The fact that the drafters only 
provided representative mechanisms for formal lawmaking, is one such element. 
Another element is the observation that the Belgian Constitution – in contrast to 
some of the constitutions that inspired it – does not explicitly state that lawmak-
ing, as a matter of principle, should happen in an exclusively representative man-
ner. If the drafters thought representation was crucial, it would have been logical 
for them to import the formulas on representation from 1791 into the Belgian 
Constitution, but they did not. A further relevant element is the prominent role 
the drafters wished to give to public opinion. They consciously created several 
channels through which the opinions of citizens would be expressed, would con-
test and would influence policy. And then there is, of course, the division of 
powers: deeply concerned about power concentrations, the drafters set up various 
power-dividing mechanisms. 
There are more elements that can be taken into consideration, and it is cer-
tainly not obvious how much weight should be given to each. The only way to 
make such a judgment, as Ronald Dworkin has never stopped repeating, is by 
rising above the concrete elements at play and by stepping up on “the ladder 
of theoretical ascent” (Dworkin, 1997, p. 359). In difficult cases, triggered by 
new and unforeseen circumstances, one can only judge correctly by making use 
of abstract moral or political principles (Dworkin, 1996). Some claim that such 
a normative judgment is not necessary and that looking at the text is enough to 
declare referendums unconstitutional. But this smacks of hypocrisy. It means that 
one places all the weight on the first element to the exclusion of all other ele-
ments. Hence, one is making a normative judgment, albeit without admitting it 
and without disclosing the principles that motivate this judgment. Fortunately, 
most opponents of referendums have never claimed to be only looking at the 
words of the text. They usually acknowledge that it is necessary to climb up to the 
level of more abstract principles. This is precisely why they invoke the doctrine of 
national sovereignty. According to them, this doctrine, as a systematic articula-
tion of the drafters’ views on sovereignty, provides a comprehensive scheme for 
thinking about representation and participation in the Belgian context. 
My claim is that the doctrine is not at all suited to this purpose. The core of 
the drafters’ constitutional programme was to avoid power concentrations by 
39 Of course, one can introduce referendums regardless of the ideas of the founders, especially 
because changing the Belgian Constitution is relatively easy. However, even in this scenario 
coherence with its general principles should be a matter of concern. Moreover, the argument 
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means of interlocking institutional guarantees and by empowering the judgment 
of individual citizens. It is only in light of this broad idea that we can cogently 
understand their concrete decisions, starting with the omission of the word sov-
ereignty from the Constitution. I do not wish to take a position here on whether 
contemporary Belgians remain bound to the decisions of their long-deceased 
founders. But if the goal is to continue the 1831 constitutional project in a coher-
ent way, then it is from this broad idea that one should start. When applying this 
idea to the question of referendums, the problem of particracy looms large. The 
rise of parties has created the very power concentrations and lack of account-
ability which the drafters ardently wished to prevent.40 Referendums naturally 
offer themselves as part of the solution. They are a strong means of activating 
and empowering public opinion, and they serve as a pillar in the decision-making 
process that cannot be colonised by professional politicians.41 Thus, rather than 
a break with the constitutional project, referendums might well be an effective 
continuation of it in today’s circumstances.42 
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